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Dictatorship has been one of the most persistent regimes types in history. Different 
dictators have applied different strategies for maintaining political support across different 
societies. We discuss and empirically estimate the hypothesis that states that dictators rely 
more on patronage as compared to the general provision of public goods for political support. 
Our results, based on the data from cross-section of the countries from all continents, confirm 
this hypothesis. We use military spending as an indicator of the patronage to military and the 
secondary school enrolment as an indicator of the provision of public goods. In the separate 
sets of regressions, we conclude that dictatorship has a significant negative effect on the 
secondary school enrolment rate and a significant positive effect on military expenditure as 
percentage of GDP. These effects, in turn, might have caused the persistent of dictatorships in 
many societies. In order to generalise these findings, we also check robustness of the findings 
with respect to other variables like infant mortality rate, average life expectancy, Human 
Development Index (HDI), corruption, rule of law, ease of doing business and 
competitiveness. The robustness analysis confirms our findings.    
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Dictatorships and their behaviours towards patronage and public goods provision 
are the topics of debate in various fields like political science, economics, and public 
choice. In general, dictatorship is defined as “a form of government in which one person 
or a small group possesses absolute power without effective constitutional limitations”. 
Historically, it has taken various shapes, and is experienced by almost all of the existent 
civilisations.
1
 However, in all of its instances, it is characterised by the concentration of 
power in few hands and hence, the existence of a dominant coalition [Magalhaes (1995); 
Gregor (2001); Olson (1993); North, et al. (2009) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)].
2
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1 For instance, absolute monarchies in the Medieval Europe; the early Muslim identities; communist 
regimes in Soviet Union, China and North Korea; the present-day monarchies in most of the Arab countries; 
and the military rulers in the third world countries are the major forms that it has taken in various societies and 
at various times. 
2 For instance, North’s, et al. (2009) characterisation of natural state from Fragile Natural State to Basic 
Natural State, and from Basic Natural State to Mature Natural State is simply the expansion of a dominant 
coalition; or in other words, the fraction of people with power in hand increases as natural state develop from 
fragility to maturity. Similarly, to Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), dictatorship is a set of absolutist and 
exclusive political institutions from which exclusive economic institutions like limited protection to property 
rights, limited rule of law, and limited contract enforce mechanism emanate. Thus, the exclusive group 
dominates in the political, economic and social aspects of life. 
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The politically dominant coalition also has a privileged position in the economic sphere 
as the political system is often used to regulate economic competition and create rents. 
Thus, instead of open access to the wide cross-section of society, dictatorship is 
associated with limited access order where a dominant coalition dominates the rest of 
population. The limited access order, in turn, makes dictatorship as an undesirable form 
of political regimes as compared to constitutional democracy as far as economic 
development is concerned [Lipset (1959); Drèza and Sen (1989); Olson (1993); 
Przeworski, et al. (2000)].
3
 
However, despite the universal agreement on its undesirability, dictatorship has 
been persistent throughout the history, and still exists in large parts of the world.
4
 For 
instance, Deacon (2009) notes that 68 percent of the world’s countries are governed by 
nondemocratic regimes during the last half of the 20th century, and over one-third 
remained nondemocratic as of 2000. Similarly, with regard to the persistence of military 
rule, Mulligan, et al. (2004) claim that three-fourth of the countries in the world have 
experienced direct military rule since 1945.
5
 Additionally, the historical analysis 
illustrates that military has been an important component in the persistence of non-
democratic regimes. This reflects that dictatorship encompasses the use of violence in 
sustaining its political power or the associated economic rents. 
In this paper, we concentrate on the undesired effects of dictatorships. In particular, we 
want to examine whether dictatorships provide patronage to few relative to the provision of 
public goods to general masses. Patronage is an institution whereby rulers allocate material 
benefits to a selected group of citizens or agents of the state in return for political support. 
Though patronage is not specific to a particular regime type; it can exist in any type of regime, 
depending upon the objectives of the rulers. In the same way, the patronage strategies that the 
rulers adopt, and the beneficiaries of the resulting patronage strictly depend on the objectives 
of the ruler. However, in all cases, it has severe implications for the provision of public 
services. The reason is that dictators rely largely on the provision of excludable goods like 
patronage or targeted transfers. Hence, the provision of public goods should be significantly 
poor under dictatorships. We are of the view that patronage, in all cases, has severe 
implications regarding the quantity and quality of public services for general masses. 
Qualitative evidence suggests that the quality of public services declines when dictatorship is 
imposed and improves when dictatorship is replaced [Deacon and Saha (2005)].
6
  For 
instance, according to Deacon (2009), countries that either lack a legislature or have only a 
 
3According to Olson (1993), the main obstacle to long-run progress in autocracies is that individual 
rights to property and contracts can never be secure, at least over the long run. 
4According to North, et al. (2009), the rents associated with dictatorship order social relations, control 
violence, and establish social cooperation within the dominant coalition. These incentives, in turn, make 
dictatorship advantageous to the members of dominant coalition as compared with other alternatives. Thus, the 
dominant coalition uses its power to sustain with the status quo in order to maintain its privileges. 
5Mulligan, et al. (2004) further argue that the total number of dictatorships constituted a majority of the 
world’s governments between 1950 and 1991 and comprised over 40 percent at the start of 21st century. 
6The authors provide various examples. For instance, the authors note that when Nigeria came to under 
military rule in 1983, the proportion of children staying in school to the fourth grade fell from 81 percent to 72 
percent and childhood disease immunisation rates fell by more than one-half. In Argentina, the rural population’s 
access to safe water increased after civilian rule was established in 1973 from 12 percent in 1970 to 26 percent in 
1973, but then dropped markedly after the military coup in 1976 to 17 percent in 1984. Greece’s infant mortality 
rate dropped by one-fourth as the country made the transition to democracy during the 1970s. 
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rubber stamp body enroll only 20 percent of their school age populations in secondary school; 
countries with effective legislatures enroll 81 percent.   
This paper analyses the interaction between the authoritarian regimes, patronage, 
and the provision of public goods for masses. We particularly, contribute to the literature 
by combining both the patronage and public goods in the same empirical setting. We 
want to show that dictators allocate more patronage or targeted transfers relative to 
democratic rulers. However, they provide a meager amount of public goods, again, 
relative to democracies. Our measure of patronage is military spending which, if our 
hypothesis is true, should be higher in dictatorships than in democracies. Second, our 
measure of public good provision is secondary school enrollment rate which, given our 
hypothesis, should be significantly and negatively affected by the persistence of 
dictatorships. Finally, in order to generalise these findings, we do robustness analysis 
with respect to other variables like infant mortality rate, average life expectancy, Human 
Development Index (HDI), corruption, rule of law, ease of doing business and 
competitiveness. The robustness analysis is aimed at providing additional support to our 
hypothesis. The remaining paper is organised in three sections. Section 2 surveys some of 
the literature that clarifies the issue discussed in the paper and lays the foundation for the 
theoretical framework of our analysis. After setting out the theoretical framework, we 
provide, in Section 3, a detailed analysis of data, empirical results, and discussions in 
light of the available literature and our empirical results. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
   
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Dictatorship has adverse consequences for a variety of political and economic aspects. 
In terms of political development, the structure of dictatorship is not consistent with the 
theoretical aspects of democratic norms; and thus, it has severe implications for the 
institutionalisation and stabilisation of democratic culture [Ikpe (2000)]. Second, it encourages 
patronage politics and thereby, enhances the development of clientalist networks [Wintrobe 
(2000)]. Similarly, in terms of economic development, dictatorship and its associated 
absolutist economic institutions discourage Schumpeterian creative destruction [North (1990); 
Wintrobe (2000); Acemoglu, et al. (2010); Acemoglu and Robinson (2012)]. The fear of 
predation by dictators make the innovators and the new entrants shy in investing in research 
and development and making long term investments, respectively.
7
 In this section, we discuss 
the literature into two sub-sections that is related mainly to the theme of the paper.  
 
2.1.  Dictatorships and Patronage  
Patronage and Clientalism are the defining characteristics of Max Weber’s broad 
definition of Patrimonialism.
8
  Patrimonialism is not specific to any particular regime 
type; however, it is mostly found in dictatorships. Dictators rely on propaganda, 
 
7The literature on the economic effects of regime type initiated with the theoretical hypothesis in the 
seminal work of Lipset (1959). Onwards research analysed various aspects. For instance, Przeworski, et al. 
(2000), based on the data from 35 countries, conclude that per capita income is associated with the types of 
political regimes. In particular, they conclude that poorest countries are dictatorships. Similarly, Drèza and Sen 
(1989) argue that all famines have happened under autocratic rule. 
8 Patrimonialism is a system of personal rule in which the ruler dispenses offices and benefits to 
subordinates in return for loyalty, support and services. Clientalism is a subset of Patrimonialism that displays 
patron-client relationships in the exercise of public authority and distribution of benefits. 
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repression, controlled information, and restricted freedom of speech for their political 
power. In order to strengthen these instruments, dictators can either resort to the 
distribution of largesse or to violence. However, in the latter case, they need a specialised 
force to conduct violence which is often available in the form of military [Magalhaes 
(1995); Wintrobe (2001, 2012); Acemoglu, et al. (2010)]. Thus, in autocratic regimes, the 
military protect the rule; while, in return, it is endowed with a privileged position in the 
patronage and rent-seeking activities of political elites [Huntington (1968); O’Donnell 
(1973); Finer (1976); Levi (1988); McGuire and Olson (1996); Acemoglu, et al. (2010)].
9
 
The self-interest of military has been extensively discussed in the literature on 
dictatorships. For instance, according to Nordlinger (1977), the majority of coups are partly or 
entirely motivated by the defense or enactment of the corporate interests of military. 
Relatedly, Tullock (1987) argues that dictatorships are usually overthrown by the high-
ranking officials within the incumbent government. Regarding the violence capabilities of 
military, Acemoglu, et al. (2010) argue that all non-democratic regimes rely on some degree 
of repression against the competing groups, and this repression is often exercised by the 
military. Similarly, Wintrobe (2001) asserts that a rent-seeking military is the cheapest way to 
solve the ‘Dictator’s Dilemma’.10 Thus, in autocracies, control of the armed forces is crucial 
for capturing and maintaining the apparatus of the government. However, controlling military 
is costly and the resources spent on it are not available for other purposes.  
In the first instance of dictatorships, the military rules directly where it decides about 
the patronage to itself, and the provision of non-excludable public goods to citizens. 
Obviously, the special interests of other privileged groups are protected even under the 
military dictatorships. In case of civilian dictatorships, military serves as an agent of the 
elite.
11
 In such arrangements, the civilian dictators determine the size of patronage to the 
military, the provision of private benefits to the special interest groups, and the provision of 
non-excludable and non-rival public goods to the citizens. Nevertheless, this allocation 
crucially depends on the bargaining power of each interest group, and the degree of the rulers’ 
reliance on each of them for political power.
12
 In both of these forms, the military provides the 
 
9 For instance, in the Medieval European monarchies, royal families had specialised military forces that 
served their interests. Similarly, in modern dictatorships, the interests of the political elites and the military are 
generally allied. The logic is simple and is provided with details in Kimenyi (1987) and Mbaku (1991). In 
democracies, where the legislative bodies generally allocate and oversee the resources assigned to the military, 
the rent-seeking of military is generally confined to political lobbying. However, in dictatorial regimes, the 
military face different constraints. Rents are created and allocate by the dictator to groups supporting the ruler 
[Kimenyi (1987); Mbaku (1991)]. 
10 Wintrobe (2001) defines Dictator’s Dilemma as “the inability of dictator to know that how much 
support he has among the general population as well as among smaller groups with the power to depose him. 
The author further argues that there is always a class of people who are repressed under a dictatorship; and there 
is also, in any successful dictatorship, another class- the overpaid. See also, Wintrobe (2012) for the details. 
11 Examples of the military dictatorships include General Ayub Khan, General Muhammad Ziaul-Haq, and 
General Pervez Musharraf, all the three in Pakistan; the regimes established in Turkey after the coups in 1960, 1971, 
and 1980; the regime in Guatemala after the coup of 1954 under the leadership Carlos Catrillo Armas; the regime in El 
Salvador in 1956 with the government of Oscar Osoriothe; the regime in Brazil after the overthrow of President Joao 
Goulart’s government in 1964; and the regime in Greece after the military coup of 1967. Similarly, the examples of 
civilian dictatorship supported by military include Getulio Vargas established in Brazil in 1937, Ferdinand Marcos’s 
long-lasting regime in the Philippines and President Alberto Fujimori’s regime’s in Peru. 
12 Mbaku (1991) argues that in authoritarian systems, political success tends to be highly dependent on 
the use of force and therefore, the groups with comparative advantage in violence dominate in competition for 
rents. See also Acemoglu, et al. (2010). 
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coercive force needed to maintain the regime security. In particular, the military leaders assure 
that the competitive interest groups do not develop the modes of behaviour that are 
detrimental to the state’s security. Activities of such competing groups are carefully monitored 
by the military elites. In return, the military receives rents via a share of government 
expenditure [Hewitt (1992); Sandler and Harley (1995); Goldsmith (2003)]. Thus, in a sense, 
this is an exchange relationship. However, to the extent that resources provided to the military 
are in exchange for some favour to the regime and not for some productive activity, such 
allocation is a rent or a transfer of income to the military.  
  
2.2.  Dictatorships and Public Good Provision 
Although, the literature has not fully identified the complete set of priorities of different 
types of regimes; however, it has consensus on the differences between dictatorships and 
democracies regarding the provisions of public services [McGuire and Olson (1996); 
Niskanen (1997); Lake and Baum (2001); Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003); Deacon (2009)]. 
For instance, according to McGuire and Olson (1996), dictators maximise and expropriate the 
budgetary surplus while redistributive democracies maximise the welfare of the elite section 
of society. Thus, dictators will both charge higher taxes and under-provide public goods. In 
contrast, democratic rulers have more encompassing interests in the provision of public 
services. This implies that institutional changes that result in increasing the size of the winning 
coalition would increase the provision of public goods and decrease the share of government 
revenue spent on transfers to the politically powerful.
13
 Similarly, Niskanen (1997) quote that 
democratic rulers maximise the welfare of the median citizen and thereby, provide more 
public goods than dictators do.
14
  
According to Lake and Baum (2001), it is the degree of contestability in the political 
market that matters for the differences in the behaviours of dictators and democratic rulers 
with regard to policy choices. In democracy, the leader’s position is highly contestable relative 
to dictatorship.
15
 The higher degree of competition associated with democracies result in 
relatively greater levels of public goods and smaller amount of rents to politicians than would 
 
13 This idea is equivalent to the expansion in North, et al. (2009) dominant coalition and an increased 
inclusiveness in Acemoglu and Robinson (2012). 
14 The only notable difference between McGuire and Olson (1996) and Niskanen (1997) is that in the former, 
the democratic rulers maximise the welfare of elite faction while in the later; the democratic rules maximise the welfare 
of the median citizens, defined in terms of incomes. However, the predictions of both the models are similar. For 
instance, in both tax rates are lower and public spending higher under democracy than under autocracy. Thus, in both 
of these models, differences in the policy choices under alternative political systems are driven by differences in the 
degree to which government represents the interests of broad versus narrow segments of society. 
15 This is because the entry and exit costs to the monopoly position are relatively low in democracies. 
In contrast, the dictatorship is characterised by high entry and exit costs. For instance, entry might require 
deposing an all-powerful ruler by force with the possibility of failure. In case of failure, the contender might 
face exile or even death. Exit by a deposed dictator can be equally costly. We have example of Saddam Hussain 
in Iraq where the cost for him was death. Similar was the case of Qadafi in Libya. In case of Pakistan, Pervez 
Musharraf survived but he is ousted from the country. Hosni Mubarak is in prison after the separation from the 
monopoly position. In addition to the costs to non-democratic rulers, entry and exit may also involve costs to 
the citizens if the entry or exit takes the form of revolution or civil war etc. The recent revolutions in Egypt, 
Libya or Syria are living examples of the costs to the citizens. For instance, the strikers in Al-Tahrir square in 
Egypt not only faced the opportunity costs in terms of foregone earnings; but they also faced several casualties. 
Similarly, in cases of Libya and Syria, it has taken the form of civil war, involving significant costs to both the 
supporters of ruling class and the opponents. 
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be observed under the less competitive dictatorial regimes. In the same way, Bueno de 
Mesquita, et al. (2003) points out that the performance of governments with regard to public 
good provision, patronage and corruption, the leader’s longevity in office, and other matters 
largely depend on the size of the selectorate and the size of the winning coalition.
16
 Second, 
education and health care systems can be characterised as relatively broadly-based public 
goods. Thus, investing in the provision of public services such as education and health are the 
relatively cheap ways of gathering political support for leaders with large winning coalitions, 
and relatively expensive for leaders with small winning coalitions. Since in democracy, the 
size of winning coalition is generally larger than that of the dictatorships, so democracies are 
more prone to the provision of public goods. In contrast, in dictatorship, the size of the 
winning coalition is small, so targeted transfers and patronage policies are less costly and 
more effective for political survival. 
In all of the three lines of research discussed above, the differences in regime types 
reflect the size of the privileged group relative to the total population, termed as the system’s 
inclusiveness. In an ideal democracy, the privileged group is the majority of the entire 
population, while in dictatorship the elite class includes the dictator and his close associates. In 
a sense, the system’s inclusiveness serves the same role as an ‘encompassing interest’ of the 
McGuire and Olson (1996), the ‘contestability’ of Lake and Baum (2001), and the ‘winning 
coalition’ of Bueno de Mesquita, et al. (2003). This is because all of them argue that since 
dictators need lesser support relative to representative democrats from the public; therefore, 
they provide lesser public goods compared to democratic rulers. Our objective in this paper is 
to provide some empirical evidence to the above debate. First, we examine the nature of 
relationship between dictatorship and the provision of public goods by using a large set of 
data. Onwards, we test the patronage hypothesis by using the same data. To our knowledge, 
this is the first kind of work which combines the two hypotheses by using a larger data set 
from all continents of the world. In the end, we provide additional support to our hypothesis 
by checking the robustness of our results through some additional variables of public goods 
and patronage.    
  
3.  DATA, EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In this section, we provide the findings of our analysis. Our major emphasis is on 
the explanatory power of dictatorship while controlling for a bunch of other possible 
explanatory variables. In this section, first, we describe the summary sketch of our data. 
Second, we provide the estimation results and discuss those in case of secondary school 
enrollment rate. Third, we illustrate the results and discussion of military spending. 
Finally, we report the results of robustness analysis.    
 
3.1.  Data and Summary Statistics 
Given the data limitations, we rely on cross-sectional regressions which are based on 
both annual and averaged data.  However, the data is highly variable-specific, depending on 
 
16 The selectorate includes all individuals who can potentially affect the selection of the government 
and therefore its policies. The selectorate roughly equates to the electorate in a modern democracy, to 
Communist party membership in a Soviet style communist state, and to the ruling family in a hereditary 
monarchy. The winning coalition, a subset of the selectorate, is the set of individuals whose support is necessary 
for the government to stay in power. In a democracy, a winning coalition must include at least 50 percent of the 
selectorate, while in a military dictatorship it could be a small cadre of officers. 
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the availability of data. The use of cross-sectional data is justified by three factors. First, the 
panel is not balanced, i.e. in some countries; the variables are the averages over long periods 
but in other cases, they are the averages over small periods. For instance, if a country is either 
established later or if the data is not available over long period for it; then we use the data for 
the available smaller periods. Second, the institutional variables are highly persistent. For 
instance, democracy in developed countries and monarchy in Arab countries are persistent 
over the whole period covered. Third, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is endogenous; 
especially in case of secondary school enrolment rate if we take into account the implications 
of human capital for economic growth. So, unbalanced panel combined with persistent 
measure of polity and endogenous GDP would not add much to the analysis as far as the main 
variable of interest is concerned. The selection of countries is highly random and our sample 
includes all those for which the variables of our interest are available. The list of countries 
along with data on their major indicators is given in Table A2 in the Appendix. The data is 
taken from various sources and considerable care is taken in the construction of variables. 
Additionally, in Table A4, we provide the details of the definitions of variables and their 
sources. 
For our analysis, we employ two alternative indices of country’s regime type. The first 
one, denoted by dictatorship1, is based on the nation’s polity score which is formed by 
subtracting its autocracy score from its democracy score. It is taken from the Polity IV 
database [Marshall and Jaggers (2000)] which rates countries based on the degree of political 
competition, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and the extent of 
legislative and judicial constraints on the chief executive. The second measure, denoted by 
dictatorship2, is based on Golder (2005) which measure regime type by a dummy variable 
where democracy takes a value 0 while dictatorship takes a value of 1. Both of these measures 
are averaged from 1960 onwards and constructed in such a way that ranges from 0(ideal 
democracy) to 1(extreme dictatorship). Our dependent variables on public good provision and 
patronage are secondary school enrolment rate and the military expenditure respectively.  
The summary statistics, given in Table 1, show that the average scores on our 
measures of dictatorships are 0.44 and 0.59 for dictatorship1 and dictatorship2, 
respectively. This indicates that on average; more than 40 percent of countries in our 
sample have experienced dictatorship since 1960.
17
 The continental-wise division reflects 
that sub-Saharan Africa leads the world with more than 62 percent of its countries 
persisted with dictatorship. Sub-Saharan Africa is followed by Asia and then the rest of 
the countries.
18
 Similarly, the countries in Neo-Europe which includes Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, and the United States have persisted with ideal democracy. Neo-Europe is 
followed by main Europe which has very low scores on both measures of dictatorships, 
reflecting the higher degrees of democracies in most of the European countries.
19
  
 
17 The differences are due to the fact that the second measure is based on just the dummy variable for 
years in which the countries have experienced dictatorship while the first measure is not based on the years the 
countries have experienced dictatorship in; instead, it depends upon the characteristics of the selection of chief 
executives, check and balances on the chief executives and the degree of political competition. However, the 
correlation between our two measures is 83 percent. 
18 In Asia, we have seen a variety of dictatorships ranging from military dictatorships in countries like 
Pakistan, Thailand etc. to Arab monarchies and communist dictatorship in China. The rest of the countries 
mainly include Latin and South American countries. 
19 See for the detailed regional divide of countries Table A3 in the Appendix. 
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Table 1 
 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variable World Europe Asia Sub-Saharan Africa Neo-Europe Others 
Secondary School Enrolment 55.78 
(32.94) 
97.7 
(9.85) 
59.36 
(20.97) 
21.60 
(16.49) 
108.80 
(26.54) 
50.92 
(19.88) 
Military Expenditure 2.55 
(2.45) 
1.97 
(0.76) 
5.15 
(4.23) 
2.07 
(1.19) 
2.21 
(1.28) 
1.66 
(1.02) 
Dictatorship1 0.44 
(0.32) 
0.10 
(0.18) 
0.58 
(0.36) 
0.62 
(0.17) 
0 
(0) 
0.44 
(0.26) 
Dictatorship2 0.59 
(0.42) 
0.16 
(0.29) 
0.71 
(0.40) 
0.93 
(0.10) 
0 
(0) 
0.57 
(0.37) 
GDP Per Capita 3973 
(6925) 
7651 
(4370) 
6695 
(12939) 
850 
(2060) 
11592 
(4558) 
1733 
(1624) 
Primary School Enrolment 93.5 
(21.4) 
102.74 
(5.53) 
96.15 
(14.37) 
77.88 
(27.89) 
101.88 
(3.55) 
98.59 
(19.52) 
Public Spending on Education 4.14 
(1.44) 
5.3 
(1.2) 
3.78 
(1.52) 
3.55 
(1.17) 
5.58 
(0.56) 
3.98 
(1.35) 
Population (in million) 26.7 
(82.5) 
20.11 
(21.39) 
81.53 
(172.56) 
7.3 
(9.4) 
52.8 
(85.5) 
9.25 
(14.71) 
Openness 54 
(40.4) 
72 
(76.5) 
56.99 
(31.44) 
43.84 
(16.22) 
36.15 
(16.22) 
52.14 
(26.82) 
Area (in thousands square 
Kilometers) 
1050.9 
(2024.8) 
229 
(184.6) 
1165.5 
(2234.2) 
691.21 
(538.17) 
6955.1 
(4574) 
995.9 
(1638.2) 
Aid Per Capita 14.73 
(19.01) 
3.9 
(11.4) 
11.92 
(26.61) 
20.97 
(11.25) 
0 
(0) 
19.56 
(20.11) 
Civil Conflict 0.79 
(0.74) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.89 
(0.74) 
1.19 
(0.75) 
0.25 
(0.5) 
0.83 
(0.65) 
External Conflict 0.36 
(0.48) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
0.58 
(0.51) 
0.31 
(0.47) 
0.5 
(0.58) 
0.37 
(0.49) 
Global Effect 2.39 
(0.25) 
2.38 
(0.21) 
2.29 
(0.21) 
2.40 
(0.17) 
2.63 
(0.36) 
2.42 
(0.31) 
Natural Resources Rents 16.13 
(13.29) 
9.7 
(9.8) 
19.70 
(17.73) 
15.68 
(11.03) 
10.25 
(6.29) 
18.66 
(13.26) 
Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalisation 0.29 
(0.29) 
0.22 
(0.28) 
0.29 
(0.33) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
0.56 
(0.43) 
0.28 
(0.26) 
English Common Law 0.31 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.32) 
0.42 
(0.51) 
0.42 
(0.50) 
1 
(0) 
0.17 
(0.38) 
Muslim 25.80 
(37.74) 
1.11 
(2.5) 
56.45 
(43.70) 
28.38 
(31.05) 
0.4 
(0.37) 
22.36 
(39.93) 
Urbanisation 48.6 
(23.22) 
68.34 
(12.40) 
49.92 
(25.12) 
27.07 
(11.76) 
80.3 
(5.03) 
50.32 
(19.52) 
Infant Mortality Rate 45.50 
(37.09) 
37.48 
(30.95) 
34.19 
(31.26) 
57.70 
(41.24) 
27.90 
(43.76) 
50.24 
(37.95) 
Average Life Expectancy 66.28 
(11.54) 
77.52 
(2.05) 
71.62 
(5.12) 
50.18 
(5.31) 
78.44 
(1.23) 
68.49 
(6.54) 
Human Development Index 0.64 
(0.17) 
0.84 
(0.04) 
0.68 
(0.12) 
0.43 
(0.10) 
0.89 
(0.01) 
0.65 
(0.09) 
Competitiveness 0.54 
(0.23) 
0.73 
(0.08) 
0.63 
(0.17) 
0.39 
(0.22) 
0.78 
(0.04) 
0.48 
(0.22) 
Ease of Doing Business 0.50 
(0.30) 
0.86 
(0.09) 
0.56 
(0.25) 
0.25 
(0.16) 
0.95 
(0.04) 
0.41 
(0.22) 
Corruption 0.51 
(0.22) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
0.58 
(0.13) 
0.67 
(0.16) 
0.17 
(0.14) 
0.53 
(0.17) 
Law and Order 0.63 
(0.26) 
0.89 
(0.16) 
0.70 
(0.19) 
0.48 
(0.22) 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.52 
(0.22) 
Note: Each entry is the Average of the variable with Standard Deviation in the Parenthesis. In some cases, the 
school enrolment goes above 100. However, this is due to the fact this is the proportion of students 
actually enrolled to a particular age group defined for that education. So this implies, in some cases either 
over-aged or under-aged students have been enrolled. For the detailed definition of variables see Table 
A4 in the appendix. See Table A3 in the appendix for the regional divide of countries. 
 Dictatorships, Patronage and Public Good Provision  247 
Our indicators of public good provision and patronage show divergent patterns. 
For instance, the average secondary school enrolment rate is around 21.6 percent in sub-
Saharan Africa which is the lowest among all the continents. However, patronage, 
indicated by higher military expenditure as percentage of GDP, is higher in Asia. Asian 
countries, on average, spend 5.15 percent of their GDP on military, followed by Neo-
Europe with 2.21 percent and sub-Saharan Africa with 2.07 percent. Similarly, the 
detailed summary statistics of the other control variables are shown in Table 1. Again, we 
are interested in analysing the behaviour of dictators towards the provision of public 
goods and patronage allocation. So, we expect the coefficient on our measures of regime 
type to be negatively significant in case of public goods, and positively significant in case 
of patronage. Alternatively, dictators are more inclined towards patronage allocation than 
they are to the provision of public goods. The control variables in both cases are 
different, depending upon the theoretical predictions in the available literature. 
  
3.2.  Secondary School Enrolment Rate  
Secondary school enrolment rate is the most widely used measure of public good 
provision [Lake and Baum (2001); Keefer  (2007); Deaton (2009)].
20
 The primary control 
variables used in all the specifications of the secondary school enrolment rate are real 
GDP per capita, primary school enrolment rate, and public spending on education. In 
order to control for the endogeneity of GDP per capita, we use GDP per capita of the 
initial available year for each country. In addition, we control for Sub-Saharan Africa in 
some specifications to ensure that the results are not driven by some special 
characteristics of these countries. Three different measures, i.e. population, total area and 
the degree of the openness of a country, are used to control for the scale of the economy. 
In addition to these, foreign aid per capita is also controlled for in some specifications to 
see if it has any impact on education as most of the donor agencies claim with regard to 
education. To control for targeted transfers based on ethnic politics, we also control for 
ethno-linguistic fractionalisation because ethno-linguistic fractionalisation is strongly 
correlated with civil conflicts, arising mainly from issues related to distribution.
21
   
Table 2 shows the results of our regressions for secondary school enrolment rate, 
each column including a subset of these control variables. Columns I and II represent 
baseline regressions for our two measures of dictatorship respectively. As is evident from 
the table, both of these measures have a significant negative impact on secondary school 
enrolment rate. Column I shows that a 1 percent transition from dictatorship to 
democracy results in an approximately 0.38 percent increase in the secondary school 
enrolment rate. Alternatively, a 1 percent increase in secondary school enrolment rate 
could be achieved through an approximately 2.5 percent transition from dictatorship to 
democracy. This translates to the fact that countries that are successful in comprehensive 
transition from extreme dictatorship to ideal democracy have 37.7 percent greater 
secondary school enrolment rate relative to those countries that persisted with extreme 
dictatorships. Similarly, Column II, using the second measure of dictatorship, shows that 
the difference  between  extreme  dictatorship and  ideal democracy in terms of secondary  
 
20 The selection of our possible control variables is mainly based on this literature. 
21 Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) has shown that ethnic diversity affects the incidence of civil 
wars arising mainly from issues related to the distribution of common pool in ethnically diverse societies. 
Table 2 
  OLS Regressions for Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
Explanatory Variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X 
constant –10.33 
(9.26) 
–11.85 
(10.48) 
 
5.23 
(9.26) 
–2.48 
(11.26) 
 
0.56 
(8.58) 
5.19 
(9.30) 
5.31 
(9.32) 
5.16 
(9.23) 
 
6.70 
(9.12) 
14.75 
(11.80) 
Dictatorship1 –37.73*** 
(6.68) 
 –32.33*** 
(5.83) 
 –27.65*** 
(5.44) 
–32.33*** 
(5.86) 
–32.33*** 
(5.86) 
–32.40*** 
(5.76) 
–30.54*** 
(5.57) 
–31.79*** 
(6.90) 
Dictatorship2 
 
 –29.07*** 
(5.30) 
 –22.93*** 
(5.06) 
      
GDP Per Capita 0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0006** 
(0.0002) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0005) 
Primary School Enrollment 0.54*** 
(0.086) 
0.55*** 
(0.099) 
0.42*** 
(0.081) 
0.46*** 
(0.098) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.42*** 
(0.083) 
0.42*** 
(0.082) 
0.41*** 
(0.082) 
0.41*** 
(0.08) 
0.42*** 
(0.098) 
Public Spending on Education (6.45)*** 
(1.38) 
6.94*** 
(1.23) 
6.04*** 
(1.24) 
6.77*** 
(1.17) 
5.05*** 
(1.15) 
6.05*** 
(1.26) 
6.07*** 
(1.26) 
6.05*** 
(1.23) 
6.60*** 
(1.17) 
3.99** 
(1.55) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
  –19.44*** 
(4.19) 
–15.97*** 
(4.38) 
–13.56*** 
(3.98) 
–19.41*** 
(4.27) 
–19.46*** 
(4.19) 
–19.13*** 
(4.24) 
–18.24*** 
(4.13) 
–19.77*** 
(5.40) 
Urbanisation     0.48*** 
(0.13) 
     
Population      1.02e-09 
(2.17e-08) 
   
 
 
Openness 
 
      -0.004 
(0.045 
   
Area 
 
       8.60e-07 
(1.11e-06) 
  
Per Capita Foreign Aid         -0.20 
(0.19) 
 
 
Ethno-Linguistic 
Fractionalisation 
         -6.54 
(7.14) 
R2 0.72 0.73 0.77 0.76 0.82 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.78 
F-Statistic 98.12*** 113.33*** 87.11*** 89.10*** 90.35*** 72.35*** 71.66*** 80.70*** 80.85*** 57.54*** 
N 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 73 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent. Robust Standard Errors in the Parenthesis. There are no significant differences between 
estimation with dictatorship1 and dictatorship2; therefore we use dictatorship1 in all the sensitivity specifications. 
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school rate is around 29 percent. Columns III and IV add the dummy for sub-Saharan 
Countries to Columns I and II respectively to show the effects of the characteristics of 
these countries. In both cases, the measures of dictatorships are still significant. 
Dictatorships have 32 percent and 23 percent lesser secondary school enrolment rates 
than democracies in the two cases respectively.   
To do the sensitivity analysis, from Column IV onwards, we control for additional 
factors like the degree of urbanisation, population, the degree of openness of a country, 
the total area of a country, per capita aid received by a country, and the ethno-linguistic 
fractionalisation in a country. Additionally, since there is no significant difference 
between the results of our two measures of dictatorship, therefore we report all the 
remaining specifications with our first measure of dictatorship. As is evident from the 
table, all of the scale variables like population, area and openness are insignificant, 
implying that the scale of economies does not change the magnitude and significance of 
our main results. Urbanisation is significant but still the difference between extreme 
dictatorship and ideal democracy remains at around 28 percent in terms of secondary 
school enrollment rate. Finally, ethno-linguistic fragmentation also does not have any 
significant effect on our results like the scale variables. Thus, our sensitivity analysis 
indicates that the significance of our main variable of concern, i.e. dictatorship is robust. 
After the initial results, it is always essential to see that the results are robust to the 
problems of reverse causality and endogeneity. For instance it is possible that higher 
education levels caused by increases in secondary school enrollment rate subsequently 
results in institutional improvements, i.e. it cause transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy. To explore this, we adopt the approach of instrumental variables. We use 
legal origins and Muslim denomination as instruments for our measures of dictatorships. 
Legal origins are regarded as colonial legacy, and are the most commonly used 
instruments for institutional quality [Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu and Johnson 
(2005); Keefer (2007); Kerekes and Williamson (2008)]. To our knowledge, we are the 
first to use the Muslim beliefs as instrument for dictatorship. Since the spread of Islam, 
Muslim rulers have attracted that the earth belongs to the God and they rule as God’s 
deputy or lieutenant on this earth [Crone (2003)]. Thus, Muslim beliefs have an 
associated legitimacy for the persistence of dictatorships. This is evidenced by the fact 
that majority of the countries where the percentage of Muslim population is higher have 
experienced dictatorships. Among them are Pakistan, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, 
and other Arab countries where majority of the population are Muslims. Second, we 
believe that Muslim beliefs might not have a direct effect on current policy choices with 
respect to secondary school enrollment rate.
22
 For instance, Islam does not have any 
distinctive view regarding the spread of education as compared with other religions.     
Similarly, colonial history reflects the institutional origins of a country. The idea that 
many countries have distinct legal origins is identified by La Porta, et al. (1999) and Glaeser 
and Shleifer (2002). Legal origin is shown to shape institutions because different legal 
traditions, imposed during colonisation, affect current legal systems [Djankov, et al. (2003)]. 
They are classified as common law and civil law systems. Common law, imposed during 
British colonisation, is referred to as English legal origin. The French imposed civil law 
systems. Thus, the British Common Law and the French Civil Law would be good 
 
22 The Muslim Denomination is measured as the percentage of Muslims into total population. 
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instruments for the development of subsequent political institutions in the colonised countries. 
We use British common law as one of our instruments to control for the impact of legal 
origins on current institutions. This approach circumvents the problem of endogeneity, i.e., the 
Muslim denomination and legal origins determine current political institutions, but not current 
policy choices or outcomes. Similarly, current policy outcomes such as secondary school 
enrolment cannot determine legal origins 150 to 200 years ago or Muslim denomination.  
The instruments need to be valid, i.e. only affect the dependent variable indirectly 
through their effects on the endogenous variables. To ensure the validity of instruments, 
we use Sargan’s test for the over-identifying restrictions and Hausman’s test for the 
comparison of OLS coefficients with 2SLS coefficients. The detailed results of these 
tests, summarised in Table A1 in the appendix, show that in all our regressions, the 
instruments are valid.
23
 Thus, all of the instruments influence the institutional 
development of countries, but neither is plausibly related to policy choices regarding 
secondary school enrolment rate in the 1960s onwards. The results of our 2SLS analysis 
are given in Table 3. The results indicate that our original results did not suffer from the 
significant  problems of  reverse  causality or endogeneity.  The signs and significance of  
 
Table 3 
  2SLS Regressions for Secondary School Enrollment 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrollment Rate 
Explanatory  Variables I II III IV V 
constant –28.62** 
(13.28) 
–23.73 
(14.40) 
2.33 
(12.69) 
–0.79 
(13.64) 
3.73 
(10.20) 
Dictatorship1 
 
–27.44** 
(9.60) 
 –29.10*** 
(8.89) 
 –31.18*** 
(7.58) 
Dictatorship2 
 
 –20.07** 
(8.30) 
 –24.74*** 
(7.97) 
 
GDP Per Capita 
 
0.002*** 
(0.0004) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.001*** 
(0.0003) 
0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
Primary School Enrollment 
 
0.59*** 
(0.10) 
0.58*** 
(0.11) 
0.43*** 
(0.09) 
0.46*** 
(0.10) 
0.26*** 
(0.074) 
Public Spending on Education 
 
(7.77)*** 
(1.47) 
7.68*** 
(1.36) 
6.26*** 
(1.22) 
6.65*** 
(1.16) 
4.84*** 
(1.15) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
 
  –19.92*** 
(4.08) 
–15.32*** 
(4.55) 
–13.22*** 
(3.88) 
Urbanisation     0.46*** 
(0.13) 
Adjusted-R2 0.69 0.71 0.76 0.75 0.80 
F-Statistic 86.47*** 99.26*** 85.21*** 89.35*** 91.01*** 
No. of Observation 96 96 96 96 96 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent. Robust Standard 
Errors in the Parenthesis. In 2SLS, the R2 has no statistical meaning and therefore is omitted from the 
table. For 2SLS, the appropriate test for the validity of the instrument is the Sargan test statistic which 
has the null hypothesis that instrument are not correlated with the error term of the second stage and 
therefore that the excluded instrument are correctly excluded from the regression. Failure to reject the 
null implies that the instruments are valid. For all of our specifications: For the Sargan test statistic P-
Value >0.05, which implies the validity of instruments. Similar comparing the OLS coefficients with 
those of 2SLS: For Hausman t-statistic, P-Value>0.05, which implies no significance difference between 
OLS and 2SLS estimates. For the details of the tests values, see Table A1 in the appendix. We report 
2SLS results only for those specification in which all the coefficients in case of OLS are significant.   
 
23See the note of Table 3 for the details of tests regarding the instruments. The detailed results of these 
tests are given in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
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the main variables like the degree of authoritarianism and all the other relevant controls 
remain unchanged. The only notable difference is that the coefficients on the dictatorship 
became a little bit different as they are expected in case of 2SLS. However, for all the 
specifications, the Hausman’s P-values are larger than 0.05. So, we conclude that there 
are no large differences between the OLS estimates and the 2SLS estimates, and 
consequently, the OLS coefficients are consistent. However, we report the results of 
2SLS for completeness.  
 
 
3.3.  Military Spending as Percentage of GDP 
Many proxies have been used to measure patronage in economies. The most 
notable of these are the size of public sector measured as public expenditure as 
percentage of GDP, the government wage bill, or the size of public investment etc.
24
 
However, these measures are subject to some criticism. First, the size of the public sector 
includes both spending on public services and special-interest spending, so we cannot 
separate the impact of regime type on patronage. The same is true with the government 
wage bill. Second, most of these proxies are useful when used for estimating the effects 
of various types of democracies or the quality of democracies on public budgets.
25
 Since, 
in this study, our purpose is to see the impact of dictatorship on patronage and public 
good provision, we believe that the military spending is preferable to other proxies of 
patronage or targeted transfers. Our belief is legitimised by two different but related 
justifications. First, dictators are not interested in voting or re-election; instead, they are 
interested in enhancing or maintaining their political power because most of their rents 
are associated with that power.
26
 Second, they need a specialised force to control their 
potential opponents or to dodge the threats to their regimes. The military is endowed with 
two capabilities in dictatorial regimes: first, they can overthrow the dictator; second, they 
can control his opponents by using their specialisation in violence. Due to these 
proficiencies, dictators are highly dependent on military, and therefore are more inclined 
to offer the military more than their best available alternatives.      
With regard to the military spending, the existing literature has not fully identified 
a congruent theory which is also supported by empirics [Rosh (1988); Collier and 
Hoeffler (2007); Albalate, et al. (2012)]. The main difficulty is that many factors need to 
be taken into consideration while analysing military spending. In this study, by avoiding 
parsimony, we test for a bunch of control variables along with our main variable of 
concern, i.e. regime type. In political science, it has been often argued that rulers use 
military spending to keep their militaries from overthrowing them [Nordlinger (1977); 
Leon (2010)]. In this study we test this hypothesis empirically in case of dictatorship. 
Alternatively, we want to comprehend how much the dictators incentivise the military to 
persist with their power or sustain their rule. This issue is important in the sense that 
higher rents to the military reduce the resources available for the provision of other public 
 
24 Keefer (2007) used both the government wage bill and public investment.  
25 For instance, it is useful when we compare the spending patterns of presidential and parliamentary 
democracies. 
26 In democracies, the rulers are interested in maximising their votes, and therefore they focus more on 
private interest groups, rather than public interest groups like bureaucracy, judiciary, or the military. 
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goods [Sprout and Sprout (1968)]. This section is completely devoted to the empirical 
analysis of military spending with special emphasis on dictatorships. The dependent 
variable throughout is the military spending as percentage of GDP.        
The results of ordinary least squares estimation is summarised in Table 4. In the 
first two columns, we just regress military spending on per capita GDP and our two 
measures of dictatorships respectively. Both of our proxies for dictatorships have a 
significant positive effect on military spending as is expected. For instance, in case of 
dictatorship1, extreme dictatorial regimes spend 0.88 percent of GDP more on military 
than ideal democracies do. In other words, transition from extreme form of dictatorship to 
ideal democracy reduces military spending by 0.88 percent of GDP. In the same way, our 
second measure, i.e. dictatorship2, indicates that military spending is higher in absolute 
dictatorships by 0.51 percent of GDP relative to ideal democracies. In addition, both of 
these columns have significant and positive coefficients on per capita GDP along with 
significant F-statistics for the overall regressions. 
In Columns III and IV we control for civil conflicts, external conflicts, and the size 
of population for our two measures of dictatorships respectively. In both of these 
specifications, the civil conflicts and population affect military spending positively, but 
both are insignificant. Similarly, external conflict has positive coefficients but is 
insignificant in specification in which we use our first measure of dictatorship (Column 
III); however, it is significant at 10 percent in column IV which use our second measure 
of dictatorship. In both of these specifications, the significance of our main variables of 
concern, i.e. dictatorships, remains intact. Again, since there is no significance difference 
between our two measures of dictatorships as far as estimation is concerned; so, in all of 
our sensitivity analysis, we report only specifications with our first measure of 
dictatorship which is based on data from polity IV.    
In Columns V and VI, we control for two additional scale variables, i.e . the 
total area and the degree of openness respectively. In both cases, we have no 
significant effect of these variables on the inclination to spend on military. Column 
VII is aimed at controlling for demonstration effect or global effect. In a sense, this is 
a proxy for arms race. However, it has no significant effect on military spending. 
Columns VIII and IX control for the windfall rents variables, i.e. foreign aid and 
natural resources wealth, respectively. The results show that both of the windfall 
variables have no significant effects on military spending. Additionally, Columns X, 
XI, XII control for Africa, Europe, and Asia respectively. The only significant 
continent is Asia where there are majority of dictatorships in our sample. Also, this is 
consistent with the fact that on average, Asian countries spend more on military as 
compared with other countries.
27
 Overall, in these results, three points are very 
important to be noted. First, in all of these specifications, ranging from III to XII, 
dictatorships and per capita GDP have a significant positive effect on military 
spending. Second, almost in all specifications, civil as well as external conflicts are 
insignificant. Also, the geographical variable like area, or social variable like 
population has no significant effect in the decisions to spend on military.  These 
three points together indicate that the demand factors have no motives for higher 
military spending; instead the income and patronage effects are stronger.  
 
27 See, for instance, the summary statistics. 
Table 4 
  OLS Regressions for Military Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Log (Military Expenditure as % of GDP) 
Explanatory Variables I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII 
constant –0.68 
(0.51) 
–0.53 
(0.59) 
–1.27 
(1.14) 
–0.83 
(1.18) 
–1.36 
(1.07) 
–3.16* 
(1.75) 
–1.07 
(1.36) 
–1.82 
(1.28) 
–2.01 
(1.75) 
–0.97 
(1.20) 
–1.08 
(1.17) 
–0.71 
(1.11) 
Dictatorship1 
 
0.88*** 
(0.30) 
 0.80** 
(0.35) 
 0.68** 
(0.32) 
0.90*** 
(0.35) 
0.81*** 
(0.36) 
0.84*** 
(0.32) 
0.77** 
(0.38) 
0.84** 
(0.37) 
0.85** 
(0.37) 
0.58** 
(0.29) 
Dictatorship2 
 
 0.51** 
(0.18) 
 0.48** 
(0.16) 
      
 
  
Log (GDP Per Capita) 0.13** 
(0.06) 
0.12** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.16** 
(0.07) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.07) 
0.17*** 
(0.06) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.15** 
(0.07) 
0.16*** 
(0.06) 
Civil Conflict    0.14 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.11 
(0.12) 
0.19* 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.11) 
0.13 
(0.10) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.13) 
0.15 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
External Conflict 
 
 
  0.25 
(0.17) 
0.31* 
(0.16) 
0.26 
(0.18) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
0.26 
(0.16) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
0.21 
(0.17) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
0.27 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
Log (Population) 
 
  0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
–0.04 
(0.07) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
–0.02 
(0.05) 
Log (Area) 
 
    0.08 
(0.08) 
       
Log (Openness) 
 
     0.27 
(0.21) 
      
Log Global Effect  
 
      –0.30 
(0.88) 
   
 
  
Aid Per Capita        0.004 
(0.004) 
    
Log (Natural Resources 
Rents) 
        0.10 
(.17) 
   
Africa 
 
         –0.18 
(0.24) 
  
 
Europe 
 
          0.18 
(0.17) 
 
 
Asia            0.66*** 
(0.20) 
R
2 
0.12 0.10 0.17 0.13 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.27 
F-Statistic 4.30** 4.06** 3.28*** 3.26*** 3.24*** 3.32*** 3.30*** 3.17*** 3.26*** 3.04*** 3.06*** 4.84*** 
N 95 95 95 95 95 94 95 95 94 95 95 95 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent. Robust Standard Errors in the Parenthesis. There are no significant differences between estimation 
with dictatorship1 and dictatorship2; therefore we use dictatorship1 in all the sensitivity specifications. 
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Again, in this case also, we need to check the robustness to the problems of 
reverse causality and endogeneity. For instance, the persistence of modern military 
dictatorships in the third world countries might have caused by the excessive military 
spending in the past.
28
 Even in case of civilian dictatorships, it might be the case that the 
excessive spending on military might cause the persistence of dictatorships, provided that 
these spending are higher in dictatorships relative to democracy. To take into account 
such possibilities, we provide Two Stages Least Squares (2SLS) estimates in Table 5. 
Again, the instruments that we use for our measures of dictatorships include legal origin 
of English Common Law and the religious belief of Muslim denomination. As mentioned 
earlier, the English Common law is the most frequently used instrument for political 
institutions.
29
 Also, in this case, we add an additional instrument in the form of Muslim 
religious denomination as the percentage of Muslim population in countries is highly 
correlated with our both measures of dictatorships. Our instruments satisfy the Sargan 
test for over-identifying restrictions, implying the validity of our instruments. Similarly, 
the Hausman test regarding the differences between OLS and 2SLS estimators suggests 
no significant differences between the two set of estimators in all the specifications that 
we provide in Table 5. The estimates and their standard errors are larger as are expected 
in case of the 2SLS, but our results do not suffer from the severe problems of reverse 
causality or endogeneity. Again, for completeness, we report 2SLS estimates.  
 
Table 5 
  2SLS Regressions for Military Expenditure 
Dependent Variable: Log (Military Expenditure as % of GDP) 
Explanatory Variables I II III IV V 
constant –1.44** 
(0.67) 
–2.26** 
(0.90) 
–2.62* 
(1.53) 
–3.97** 
(1.90) 
–1.28 
(1.45) 
Dictatorship1 
 
1.55*** 
(0.52) 
 1.43*** 
(0.55) 
 0.84** 
(0.41) 
Dictatorship2 
 
 1.55*** 
(0.56) 
 1.49** 
(0.67) 
 
Log (GDP Per Capita) 
 
0.20*** 
(0.07) 
0.28*** 
(0.09) 
0.22*** 
(0.08) 
0.30*** 
(0.09) 
0.18*** 
(0.07) 
Civil Conflict 
 
  0.09 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.11) 
External Conflict 
 
  0.17 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
0.11 
(0.15) 
Log (Population) 
 
  0.06 
(0.06) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
Asia     0.62*** 
(0.20) 
Adjusted-R2 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.12 0.21 
F-Statistic 6.55*** 5.96*** 3.48*** 3.39*** 4.40*** 
N 95 95 95 95 95 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent. Robust Standard Errors in the 
Parenthesis. In 2SLS, the R2 has no statistical meaning and therefore is omitted from the table. For all of our 
specifications: For the Sargan test statistic P-Value >0.05, which implies the validity of instruments. Similar 
comparing the OLS coefficients with those of 2SLS: For Hausman t-statistic, P-Value>0.05 for all cases, which 
implies no significance difference between OLS and 2SLS estimates in these cases. For the details of the tests 
values, see table A1 in the appendix. We report 2SLS results only for those specification in which some of the 
coefficients are significant in case of OLS along with baseline regressions.   
 
28In countries like Pakistan and Nigeria, the excessive spending on military, legitimised by the conflicts with 
India and ethnic conflicts respectively, has made the military’s incentives larger to remain in the government. 
29See for instance Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu, et al. (2005) and Keefer (2007). 
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3.4.  Generalisation of the Results 
As stated earlier, our objective in this study is to combine the relationships of 
dictatorship with public goods and patronage and give some generalised results in this 
regard. In order to substantiate the results in the previous sections, we check the 
robustness with regard to other measures of public goods and patronage. We take three 
other measures of public goods, i.e. infant mortality rates, average life expectancy and 
Human Development Index (HDI).
30
 All of the three reflect the public sector provision of 
the social services or public goods. Likewise, we use four other measures which can 
reflect both the provision of public goods and patronage-related activities. These 
measures include law and order, corruption, ease of doing business and 
competitiveness.
31
 For instance, if the state is based on Weberian principles, then there 
would be transparent law and order, less occurrence of corruption and the private sector 
would enjoy the ease of doing business and competitiveness. However, if the government 
resorts to patronage for political support, then we would have poor law and order, more 
corruption, and more barriers to businesses and competition. Alternatively, when political 
leaders engage in nepotism (hiring close associates) and cronyism (awarding non-
competitive government contracts to friends and relatives), they would violate rule of 
law. Likewise, when government rewards groups, families, ethnicities through licensing, 
monopoly rights or government contracts, it results in corruption, rent-seeking and kick-
backs. Thus, all of the patronage type activities restrict entry to businesses and discourage 
competition. In order to draw some proposition regarding these claims, we do the 
robustness analysis with regard to these variables. The corresponding results are shown in 
Table 6.  
As is visible from Table 6, infant mortality rates decline by around 25 infants per 
1000 infants with the complete transition from extreme dictatorship to ideal democracy. 
Likewise, average life expectancy in extreme dictatorship is around 10 years lower as 
compared to the ideal democracy. Similar is the case with HDI, i.e. HDI increases by 16 
percent with the complete transition from dictatorship to democracy. The results with 
respect to the law and order show that the strength and impartiality of the legal system or 
observance of the rule of law is lower in dictatorships by around 29 percent as compared 
to democracies. Likewise, dictatorships are around 6 percent more corrupt as compared to 
the ideal democracies. Alternatively, corruption in the form of excessive patronage, 
nepotism, job reservations, ‘favour-for-favours’, secret party funding, and suspiciously 
close ties between politics and business is highly prevalent in dictatorships. The index of 
ease of doing business shows the relative easiness in indicators like construction permits, 
registration, getting credit, tax payment mechanism etc. Our results show that these 
indicators are relatively easier in democracies by around 32 percent. Finally, the Global 
Competitiveness Index (GCI) integrates the microeconomic and the macroeconomic 
aspects of competitiveness into a single index. It assess the factors, policies and 
institutions, based on 12 pillars of competitiveness, which are essential for long-term 
growth and prosperity. Our results with respect to the competitiveness indicate that 
transition from extreme dictatorship to ideal democracy enhances the average 
competitiveness of countries by 42 percent.   
 
30 See Table A4 in the appendix for the precise definition of these variables. 
31 Again, see Table A4 for the definition of these variables. 
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Table 6 
 Robustness with Other Measures of Public Goods and Patronage 
Dependent Variable: Secondary School Enrolment Rate 
Explanatory 
Variables Infant Mortality 
Life 
Expectancy HDI Law and Order Corruption 
Ease of Doing 
Business Competitiveness 
constant 31.89** 
(13.26) 
56.98*** 
(4.44) 
0.58*** 
(0.06) 
0.65*** 
(0.14 
0.058*** 
(0.13) 
0.68*** 
(0.15 
0.65*** 
(0.18) 
Dictatorship1 24.83** 
(11.72) 
–9.80** 
(4.61) 
–0.16** 
(0.077) 
–0.29** 
(0.14) 
0.064** 
(0.023) 
–0.32** 
(0.14) 
–0.42** 
(0.19) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
–0.00067*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0004*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00001** 
(0.000004) 
–0.00001** 
(0.000004) 
0.0007* 
(0.00037) 
0.00026* 
(0.00014) 
Public 
Spending on 
Health 
–2.22** 
(1.13) 
0.80** 
(0.36)      
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
2.33** 
(1.11) 
–16.82*** 
(2.16) 
–0.12*** 
(0.027) 
0.02*** 
(0.005) 
0.09** 
(0.03) 
–0.09** 
(0.04) 
–0.04*** 
(0.005) 
Urbanisation 0.30* 
(0.16) 
0.13*** 
(0.04) 
0.003*** 
(0.0005) 
0.007*** 
(0.0003) 
–0.001** 
(0.0004) 
0.68*** 
(0.16) 
0.001** 
(0.00055) 
Adjusted-R2 0.60 0.74 0.78 0.67 0.66 0.52 0.55 
F-Statistic 73.23*** 77.99*** 96.47*** 63.67*** 63.22*** 54.95*** 49.35*** 
No. of 
Observation 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Note: * Significant at 10 percent; ** Significant at 5 percent; *** Significant at 1 percent. Robust Standard 
Errors in the Parenthesis. In 2SLS, the R2 has no statistical meaning and therefore is omitted from the 
table. For 2SLS, the appropriate test for the validity of the instrument is the Sargan test statistic which 
has the null hypothesis that instrument are not correlated with the error term of the second stage and 
therefore that the excluded instrument are correctly excluded from the regression. Failure to reject the 
null implies that the instruments are valid. For all of our specifications: For the Sargan test statistic P-
Value >0.05, which implies the validity of instruments. Similar comparing the OLS coefficients with 
those of 2SLS: For Hausman t-statistic, P-Value>0.05, which implies no significance difference between 
OLS and 2SLS estimates. For the details of the tests values, see table A1 in the appendix. We report 
2SLS results only for those specification in which all the coefficients in case of OLS are significant.   
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This study is motivated by the recent literature that emphasises the importance of 
institutions for economic development. The literature has, so far, arrived at the 
conclusion that absolutist political institutions create absolutist economic institutions 
which, in turn, are associated with limited access order.  In such a limited access order, 
the wide-cross section of society is deprived of the access to general services like 
education or health on the one hand and on the other hand, lessor or no protection is 
provided to their property rights. Consequently, the countries which have persisted with 
absolutist political institutions are facing the problem of under-development. Given this 
premise, there is a growing theoretical debate about the inclination of dictators to spend 
more on military to sustain and prolong their regimes; and to spend less on the provision 
of public services in its place. In this study, we have endeavoured to draw some 
conclusions empirically about this debate by testing this hypothesis empirically. 
We have carried out three separate estimations in this regard. First, we estimate the 
secondary school enrolment rate as an indicator of public services provision. Second, we 
analyse military spending as an indicator of patronage. Third, in order to substantiate our 
results, we use other measures of public good provision and patronage.  In all of the 
cases, the emphasis is on the type of regime in the list of all possible explanatory 
variables. The results, based on data from the cross-section of the countries, confirm the 
hypothesis, i.e. dictatorship has a significant negative effect on public good provision and 
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a significant positive effect on the patronage. Hence, we conclude that dictators tend to 
rely more on patronage to the targeted groups for political support instead of relying on 
the wide cross-section of the society. 
Although, the study clearly demonstrates the behaviour of dictators towards the 
provision of public goods, and the patronage, we believe that more future research is 
needed to draw some general propositions for policy recommendations regarding 
institutional reforms in the third world countries. For instance, we have taken a very 
narrow approach by indexing the dictators’ behaviour towards patronage with military 
expenditure. Future work may develop an index for patronage that can capture the effects 
of targeted transfers both to the private interest groups as well as to the state’s privileged 
groups like military, bureaucracy, and the judiciary. In addition, more econometric 
analysis is clearly needed in order to understand the exact channels of causation.  
Likewise, one must be careful before generalising the findings of the paper. The reason is 
that once dictators become stronger; they could start investing on public goods for 
winning general support. In addition, it is quite possible that continuous spending on 
military prevails in order to thwart any unexpected revolt from the people. 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Table A1 
 Results of the Sargan Test for Over-identifying Restrictions and  
Hausman Specification Test 
Secondary School Enrolment Rate 
Specification 
Sargan Results Hausman Results 
Sargan Chi-Square 
Values 
P-values Hausman 
t-Values 
P-values 
I 2.88 0.578 1.49244 0.139 
II 2.208 0.698 1.409005 0.162 
III 1.536 0.909 0.481269 0.631 
IV 1.056 0.958 –0.29394 0.769 
V 0.0192 0.999 –0.66875 0.505 
Military Expenditure 
Specification 
Sargan Results Hausman Results 
Sargan Chi-Square 
Values P-values Hausman t-values P-values 
I 3.686 0.158 1.577453 0.118 
II 2.375 0.305 1.961217 0.053 
III 4.218 0.518 1.484924 0.141 
IV 3.23 0.666 1.552377 0.124 
V 1.5675 0.955 0.897085 0.372 
Robustness Analysis 
Specification 
Sargan Results Hausman Results 
Sargan Chi-Square 
Values P-values Hausman t-values P-values 
Infant Mortality Rate 2.536 0.122 1.639467 0.105 
Life Expectancy 3.750 0.130 1.261285 0.210 
HDI 3.144 0.618 1.384076 0.170 
Corruption 4.133 0.456 1.442365 0.153 
Law and Order 3.735 0.895 0.953358 0.343 
Ease of Doing Business 1.743 0.784 1.537021 0.128 
Competitivness 3.875 0.352 1.367232 0.175 
258 Khan and Shah 
Table A2 
 List of the Countries with Main Variables 
Country SSE ME DIC1 DIC2 Country SSE ME DIC1 DIC2 
Algeria 47.46 2.90 0.79 1.00 Libya 65.54 2.55 0.85 1.00 
Angola 12.68 6.00 0.75 1.00 Madagascar 20.62 1.18 0.49 0.80 
Argentina 69.05 1.15 0.40 0.33 Malaysia 55.09 2.35 0.27 1.00 
Australia 148.46 1.99 0.00 0.00 Mali 12.37 2.18 0.59 0.78 
Austria 98.56 1.03 0.00 0.00 Mauritania 16.76 3.36 0.81 1.00 
Bangladesh 29.00 1.26 0.48 0.67 Mexico 57.36 0.53 0.52 0.98 
Belgium 108.30 1.55 0.01 0.00 Morocco 32.34 3.76 0.87 1.00 
Bolivia 64.06 2.10 0.37 0.64 Mozambique 8.06 1.75 0.59 1.00 
Botswana 41.20 3.40 0.16 1.00 Oman 36.81 12.99 0.97 1.00 
Brazil 69.75 1.60 0.41 0.27 Netherlands 110.20 1.86 0.00 0.00 
Bulgaria 93.16 2.81 0.53 0.80 New Zealand 97.09 1.32 0.00 0.00 
Cameroon 21.66 1.37 0.81 1.00 Nicaragua 40.41 1.59 0.51 0.69 
Canada 97.41 1.45 0.00 0.00 Niger 5.67 1.03 0.65 0.93 
Central African Republic 10.96 1.34 0.68 0.80 Nigeria 21.32 0.79 0.56 0.71 
Sri Lanka 64.91 3.60 0.20 0.23 Norway 103.02 2.16 0.00 0.00 
Chad 9.55 2.61 0.78 1.00 Pakistan 21.16 5.14 0.47 0.48 
Chile 73.48 3.64 0.35 0.31 Panama 61.65 1.34 0.42 0.45 
China 52.89 2.05 0.87 1.00 Papua New Guinea 11.01 0.96 0.30 0.00 
Colombia 55.84 2.98 0.12 0.16 Paraguay 38.92 1.09 0.59 1.00 
Congo, Democratic Republic 21.76 1.52 0.86 1.00 Peru 65.81 1.40 0.36 0.58 
Costa Rica 51.96 
 
0.00 0.02 Poland 89.03 2.09 0.51 0.78 
Denmark 113.02 1.65 0.00 0.00 Portugal 77.98 2.12 0.27 0.55 
Dominican Republic 47.99 0.61 0.29 1.00 Qatar 76.30 3.07 1.00 1.00 
Ecuador 52.40 2.19 0.29 0.33 Saudi Arabia 80.60 10.80 1.00 1.00 
El Salvador 43.59 1.13 0.33 0.69 Senegal 15.51 1.64 0.55 1.00 
Ethiopia 15.80 3.75 0.75 1.00 Sierra Leone 15.06 2.28 0.60 0.73 
Finland 109.93 1.48 0.00 0.00 Vietnam 50.35 3.53 0.85 1.00 
France 97.12 2.85 0.10 0.00 South Africa 85.40 2.18 0.21 0.87 
Gabon 36.11 1.58 0.83 1.00 Zimbabwe 28.05 4.12 0.57 1.00 
Gambia 19.37 0.80 0.35 1.00 Spain 97.98 1.36 0.26 0.56 
Germany 101.28 1.68 0.00 0.00 Sudan 20.23 2.77 0.72 0.80 
Ghana 40.67 0.61 0.59 0.91 Sweden 104.02 1.97 0.00 0.00 
Greece 87.71 3.87 0.18 0.13 Switzerland 95.77 1.23 0.00 0.00 
Guatemala 26.73 0.86 0.42 0.20 Syria 50.10 6.01 0.90 1.00 
Guinea 18.82 1.93 0.80 1.00 Togo 24.32 2.55 0.76 1.00 
Guyana 84.69 1.05 0.46 0.74 Trinidad and Tobago 73.53 0.43 0.06 0.00 
Haiti 15.72 0.09 0.74 0.87 United Arab Emirates 63.29 7.81 0.90 1.00 
Honduras 29.85 0.63 0.33 0.53 Tunisia 49.92 1.78 0.82 1.00 
India 39.73 2.86 0.07 0.00 Turkey 50.36 3.38 0.16 0.33 
Indonesia 44.57 1.37 0.68 0.96 Uganda 11.85 2.54 0.66 0.87 
Iran 61.76 2.58 0.81 1.00 Egypt 56.27 
 
0.80 1.00 
Ireland 99.77 0.86 0.00 0.00 United Kingdom 90.32 2.91 0.00 0.00 
Israel 87.23 9.54 0.03 0.00 Tanzania 6.36 1.43 0.72 1.00 
Italy 81.39 1.94 0.00 0.00 United States 92.25 4.08 0.00 0.00 
Jamaica 69.14 0.60 0.02 0.00 Burkina Faso 6.79 1.39 0.71 1.00 
Japan 96.27 0.96 0.00 0.00 Uruguay 78.78 1.86 0.25 0.22 
Kenya 34.52 1.81 0.63 1.00 Venezuela 57.21 1.51 0.12 0.20 
Korea, South 84.96 3.03 0.43 0.74 Zambia 17.00 2.09 0.59 0.73 
Kuwait 82.38 15.56 0.91 1.00 
     Note: SSE is the School Enrollment Rate, ME is the Military Expenditure as % of GDP, DIC1 is our first 
measure of dictatorship, denoted by Dictatorship1, and DIC2 is the Dictatorship2 used in study. For the 
detailed of the definitions of variables See Table A4 in the appendix. 
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Table A3 
 Regional Divide of Countries 
Regions No. of Countries List of Countries 
Europe 18 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
Asia 19 Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, 
Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Oman, Pakistan, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Vietnam, Syria, Turkey, South Korea, UAE  
Sub-Saharan Africa 26 Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Congo Democratic Republic, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Kenya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Zimbabwe, Togo, Uganda, 
Tanzania, Burkina Faso, Zambia, Mali   
Neo-Europe 4 Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United States of America 
Others 30 Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Eucador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Libya, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Sudan, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, Venezuela, Tunisia, Egypt  
 
Table A4 
 Summary of the Definitions and Sources of Variables (Part I) 
Variable Definition Source 
Secondary 
School 
Enrollmet 
Gross Secondary School Enrollment Rate. It is the proportion, 
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially 
corresponds to the level of education shown, averaged from 1960 to 
2010. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Military 
Expenditure 
Military Expenditure are taken as Percentage of GDP, averaged from 
1960 to 2009. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Dictatorship1 Polity IV project data on Polity=democracy-autocracy. It is 
constructed such that it ranges from 1(Extreme Dictatorship) to 0(Ideal 
democracy), averaged from 1964-2009, depending upon availability. 
Polity IV, 
(Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2000) 
Dictatorship2 This indicator is based on regime type by a dummy variable where 
democracy takes a value 0 while dictatorship takes a value of 1 in a 
Particular year. It is averaged from 1960 to 2000, so that it becomes an 
index ranging from 1(Extreme Dictatorship) to 0(Ideal Democracy) 
The data on Yearly 
regime type is 
taken from Golder 
(2005) 
GDP Per 
Capita 
This is taken as the GDP per capita of the initial available year for a 
country and is taken in terms of constant 2000 $. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Primary 
School 
Enrollment 
Gross Primary School Enrollment Rate. It is the proportion, regardless 
of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to 
the level of education shown, averaged from 1960 to 2010 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Public 
Spending on 
Education 
Total Public spending on education, as Percentage of GDP, averaged 
from 1960 to 2010. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Continued— 
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Table A4—(Continued) 
Population This is taken as the total population of the initial available year for a 
country from 1960 onwards. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Openness It is measured as the sum of imports and exports of goods and services 
as percentage of GDP. It is averaged from 1960 to 2010. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Area Total Area in Square Kilometers World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Aid Per Capita Total aid Received by a Country. It represents Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) and other official aid received in constant US 
dollars, taken as average from 1960 to 2010 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Civil Conflict This is the sum of Two Dummies. One dummy takes the value of 1, if 
at least one internal conflict has taken place and it is not intervened by 
other countries since in 1960 and 0 otherwise. The other takes the 
value of 1, if at least one internal conflict has taken place and it is 
intervened by the government of other states. So our measure takes 
three values, i.e. 0, 1 or 2. 
PRIO (Peace 
Research Institute 
of Oslo 
http://www.prio.no
r/) 
External 
Conflict 
This denotes the conflict between two or more countries. It takes the 
value 1 if at least one conflict has taken place since 1960, 0 otherwise. 
PRIO (Peace 
Research Institute 
of Oslo 
http://www.prio.no
r/) 
Global Effect For a given country, this is the average of the military expenditure as 
Percentage of GDP of the rest of the World. This is calculated from 
the data used in this study. 
Calculated From 
Data on Military 
Expenditure 
Asia, Europe 
and Africa 
Dummies, takes the value of 1 if a country belongs to a particular 
Continent, 0 otherwise. 
Self-Calculated 
Natural 
Resources 
Rents 
It is measured as the per cent share of natural resources exports 
(including agricultural and raw material exports, fuel exports, food 
exports, and ores and metals exports) in GDP, averaged from 1960 to 
2000. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Ethno-
Linguistic 
Fractionali-
sation 
. It is the probability that the two randomly selected individuals from a 
given country will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group. The 
greater probability implies more ethno-linguistically diverse society. 
Easterly and 
Levine (1997) 
English 
Common Law 
It takes a value of 1 if the country’s legal origin is based on British 
common law and 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999). 
Muslim The percentage of population in a country belonging to Islam in 1999. 
La Porta, et al. calculated these values for 1999. 
La Porta et al. 
(1999). 
Urbanisation Average of urban population as percentage of total population from 
1960 to 2010. 
World 
Development 
Indicators, World 
Bank 
Note: GDP per capita is taken for the initial available year in order to take into account the implications 
of human capital for economic growth and thereby, avoid the endogeneity of GDP. Similarly, in 
most of the applied microeconomic studies, it is shown that more educated people raise fewer 
children. Therefore, to avoid the endogeneity of population, we take the population of the initial 
year for each country. 
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Table A4 
 Summary of the Definitions and Sources of Variables (Part II) 
Variable Definition Source 
Infant Mortality 
Rates 
It measures the number of infants dying before reaching one year 
of age, per 1000 live births in a given year 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank 
Average Life 
Expectancy 
Life expectancy at birth indicates the number of years a newborn 
infant would live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time of 
its birth were to stay the same throughout its life. 
World Development 
Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank 
Human Development 
Index (HDI) 
It is the geometric mean of three indexes, i.e. the Life Expectancy 
Index, the Education Index and the Income Index. These 
component indexes are based on life expectancy at birth, mean 
years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross 
national income per capita. 
Life Expectancy Index (LEI)=
     
     
 
 
Education Index (EI)= 
         
 
 
         Mean Years of Schooling Index (MYSI)= 
   
  
 
         Expected Years of Schooling Index (EYSI)= 
   
  
 
Income Index (II)= 
   (     )   (   )
  (      )   (   )
 
 
Human Development Index (HDI)=√         
 
 
 
Human 
Development 
Report published by 
UNDP 
 
 
Law and Order  
Law and order show the strength and impartiality of the legal 
system. It also shows an assessment of popular observance of the 
law. 
The International 
Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), the PRS 
group.   
 
Corruption 
It shows corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, 
job reservations, ‘favor-for-favors’, secret party funding, and 
suspiciously close ties between politics and business. 
The International 
Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), the PRS 
group.   
Ease of Doing 
Business 
The Ease of doing business is an index shows different parameters 
which define the ease of doing business in a country. It includes 
indicators like construction permits, registration, getting credit, 
tax payment mechanism etc. 
The World Bank 
Competitiveness The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) integrates the 
microeconomic and the macroeconomic aspects of 
competitiveness into a single index. 
The World 
Economic Forum 
(WEF) 
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